Fault-Tolerant Techniques for HPC

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http://graal.ens-lyon.fr/~yrobert/htdc-flaine.pdf

HTDC Winter School 2015 - Flaine



- Introduction
- 2 Checkpointing
- 3 ABFT for dense linear algebra kernels
- 4 Silent errors
- Conclusion



Intro

- 1 Introduction
 - Large-scale computing platforms
 - Faults and failures
- 2 Checkpointing
- ABFT for dense linear algebra kernel
- 4 Silent errors
- 5 Conclusion

- 1 Introduction
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Exascale platforms (courtesy Jack Dongarra)

Potential System Architecture with a cap of \$200M and 20MW

Systems	2011 K computer	2019	Difference Today & 2019	
System peak	10.5 Pflop/s	1 Eflop/s	O(100)	
Power	12.7 MW	~20 MW		
System memory	1.6 PB	32 - 64 PB	O(10)	
Node performance	128 GF	1,2 or 15TF	O(10) - O(100)	
Node memory BW	64 GB/s	2 - 4TB/s	O(100)	
Node concurrency	8	O(1k) or 10k	O(100) - O(1000)	
Total Node Interconnect BW	20 GB/s	200-400GB/s	O(10)	
System size (nodes)	88,124	O(100,000) or O(1M)	O(10) - O(100)	
Total concurrency	705,024	O(billion)	O(1,000)	
MTTI	days	O(1 day)	- O(10)	

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Exascale platforms (courtesy C. Engelmann & S. Scott)

Toward Exascale Computing (My Roadmap)

Based on proposed DOE roadmap with MTTI adjusted to scale linearly

Systems	2009	2011	2015	2018
System peak	2 Peta	20 Peta	100-200 Peta	1 Exa
System memory	0.3 PB	1.6 PB	5 PB	10 PB
Node performance	125 GF	200GF	200-400 GF	1-10TF
Node memory BW	25 GB/s	40 GB/s	100 GB/s	200-400 GB/s
Node concurrency	12	32	O(100)	O(1000)
Interconnect BW	1.5 GB/s	22 GB/s	25 GB/s	50 GB/s
System size (nodes)	18,700	100,000	500,000	O(million)
Total concurrency	225,000	3,200,000	O(50,000,000)	O(billion)
Storage	15 PB	30 PB	150 PB	300 PB
Ю	0.2 TB/s	2 TB/s	10 TB/s	20 TB/s
MTTI	4 days	19 h 4 min	3 h 52 min	1 h 56 min
Power	6 MW	~10MW	~10 MW	~20 MW

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Exascale platforms

- Hierarchical
 - 10⁵ or 10⁶ nodes
 - Each node equipped with 10⁴ or 10³ cores
- Failure-prone

MTBF – one node	1 year	10 years	120 years
MTBF – platform	30sec	5mn	1h
of 10^6 nodes			

More nodes ⇒ Shorter MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures)



Exascale platforms

- Hierarchies.
 - 10^5 or 10^6 nodes
 - 10^{3} Each node equipped with 104 cores
- Failure-prone

ABFT

Exascale

 \neq Petascale $\times 1000$

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Even for today's platforms (courtesy F. Cappello)

Intro




Overhead of checkpoint/restart

Cost of non optimal checkpoint intervals:

100%

Today, 20% or more of the computing capacity in a large high-performance computing system is wasted due to failures and recoveries.

Dr. E.N. (Mootaz) Elnozahyet al. System Resilience at Extreme Scale, DARPA




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Even for today's platforms (courtesy F. Cappello)

Classic approach for FT: Checkpoint-Restart

Typical "Balanced Architecture" for PetaScale Computers





Without optimization, Checkpoint-Restart needs about 1h! (~30 minutes each)

Systems	Perf.	Ckpt time	Source
RoadRunner	1PF	~20 min.	Panasas
LLNL BG/L	500 TF	>20 min.	LLNL
LLNL Zeus	11TF	26 min.	LLNL
YYY BG/P	100 TF	~30 min.	YYY






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Sources of failures

- Analysis of error and failure logs
- In 2005 (Ph. D. of CHARNG-DA LU): "Software halts account for the most number of outages (59-84 percent), and take the shortest time to repair (0.6-1.5 hours). Hardware problems, albeit rarer, need 6.3-100.7 hours to solve."
- In 2007 (Garth Gibson, ICPP Keynote):



In 2008 (Oliner and J. Stearley, DSN Conf.):

		Raw	Filte			
	Type	Count	%	Count	%	
	Hardware	174,586,516	98.04	1.999	18.78	ĺ
\leq	Software	144,899	0.08	6,814	64.01	\triangleright
	Indeterminate	3,350,044	1.88	1,832	17.21	

Relative frequency of root cause by system type.

Software errors: Applications, OS bug (kernel panic), communication libs, File system error and other. Hardware errors, Disks, processors, memory, network


Conclusion: Both Hardware and Software failures have to be considered

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A few definitions

- Many types of faults: software error, hardware malfunction, memory corruption
- Many possible behaviors: silent, transient, unrecoverable
- Restrict to faults that lead to application failures
- This includes all hardware faults, and some software ones.
- Will use terms fault and failure interchangeably
- Silent errors (SDC) addressed later in the presentation

Failure distributions: (1) Exponential



 $Exp(\lambda)$: Exponential distribution law of parameter λ :

- Pdf: $f(t) = \lambda e^{-\lambda t} dt$ for $t \ge 0$
- Cdf: $F(t) = 1 e^{-\lambda t}$
- Mean $=\frac{1}{\lambda}$



Checkpointing




X random variable for $Exp(\lambda)$ failure inter-arrival times:

- $\mathbb{P}(X \le t) = 1 e^{-\lambda t} dt$ (by definition)
- Memoryless property: $\mathbb{P}(X \ge t + s \mid X \ge s) = \mathbb{P}(X \ge t)$ at any instant, time to next failure does not depend upon time elapsed since last failure
- Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) $\mu = \mathbb{E}(X) = \frac{1}{\lambda}$

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Failure distributions: (2) Weibull



Weibull (k, λ) : Weibull distribution law of shape parameter k and scale parameter λ :


- Pdf: $f(t) = k\lambda(t\lambda)^{k-1}e^{-(\lambda t)^k}dt$ for t > 0
- Cdf: $F(t) = 1 e^{-(\lambda t)^k}$
- Mean = $\frac{1}{\lambda}\Gamma(1+\frac{1}{\lambda})$



Silent Errors

Checkpointing

Intro



X random variable for Weibull(k, λ) failure inter-arrival times:

- If k < 1: failure rate decreases with time "infant mortality": defective items fail early
- If k = 1: Weibull $(1, \lambda) = Exp(\lambda)$ constant failure time

Failure distributions: with several processors

 Processor (or node): any entity subject to failures ⇒ approach agnostic to granularity

• If the MTBF is μ with one processor, what is its value with p processors?

• Well, it depends

Checkpointing



Silent Errors

Silent Errors

Failure distributions: with several processors

 Processor (or node): any entity subject to failures ⇒ approach agnostic to granularity

• If the MTBF is μ with one processor, what is its value with p processors?

• Well, it depends 😉

Checkpointing



With rejuvenation

- Rebooting all p processors after a failure
- Platform failure distribution \Rightarrow minimum of p IID processor distributions
- With p distributions $Exp(\lambda)$:

$$\min \left(\mathsf{Exp}(\lambda_1), \mathsf{Exp}(\lambda_2) \right) = \mathsf{Exp}(\lambda_1 + \lambda_2)$$
 $\mu = \frac{1}{\lambda} \Rightarrow \mu_p = \frac{\mu}{p}$

ABFT

• With p distributions Weibull(k, λ):

$$\min_{1..p} \left(Weibull(k,\lambda) \right) = Weibull(k,p^{1/k}\lambda)$$

$$\mu = \frac{1}{\lambda} \Gamma(1 + \frac{1}{k}) \Rightarrow \mu_p = \frac{\mu}{p^{1/k}}$$

Silent Errors

Without rejuvenation (= real life)

- Rebooting only faulty processor
- Platform failure distribution \Rightarrow superposition of p IID processor distributions \Rightarrow IID only for Exponential
- Define μ_p by

$$\lim_{F \to +\infty} \frac{n(F)}{F} = \frac{1}{\mu_p}$$

n(F) = number of platform failures until time F is exceeded

Theorem: $\mu_p = \frac{\mu}{p}$ for arbitrary distributions

Intro

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Intuition



If three processors have around 20 faults during a time t $(\mu = \frac{t}{20})...$



...during the same time, the platform has around 60 faults $(\mu_{p}=rac{t}{60})$

MTBF with p processors

Checkpointing

Theorem: $\mu_p = \frac{\mu}{p}$ for arbitrary distributions

With one processor:

- n(F) = number of failures until time F is exceeded
- X_i iid random variables for inter-arrival times, with $\mathbb{E}(X_i) = \mu$
- $\sum_{i=1}^{n(F)-1} X_i \le F \le \sum_{i=1}^{n(F)} X_i$
- Wald's equation: $(\mathbb{E}(n(F)) 1)\mu < F < \mathbb{E}(n(F))\mu$
- $\lim_{F \to +\infty} \frac{\mathbb{E}(n(F))}{F} = \frac{1}{n}$

MTBF with p processors (2/2)

Checkpointing

Theorem: $\mu_p = \frac{\mu}{p}$ for arbitrary distributions

With p processors:

- n(F) = number of platform failures until time F is exceeded
- $n_a(F)$ = number of those failures that strike processor q
- $n_q(F) + 1 =$ number of failures on processor q until time F is exceeded (except for processor with last-failure)
- $\lim_{F \to +\infty} \frac{n_q(F)}{F} = \frac{1}{n}$ as above
- $\lim_{F \to +\infty} \frac{n(F)}{F} = \frac{1}{\mu_F}$ by definition
- Hence $\mu_p = \frac{\mu}{p}$ because $n(F) = \sum_{g=1}^p n_g(F)$




A little digression for afficionados

- X_i IID random variables for processor inter-arrival times
- Assume X_i continuous, with $\mathbb{E}(X_i) = \mu$
- Y_i random variables for platform inter-arrival times
- **Definition:** $\mu_p \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lim_{n \to +\infty} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{E}(Y_i)}{n}$
- Limits always exists (superposition of renewal processes)
- Theorem: $\mu_p = \frac{\mu}{p}$

Values from the literature

- MTBF of one processor: between 1 and 125 years
- Shape parameters for Weibull: k = 0.5 or k = 0.7
- Failure trace archive from INRIA (http://fta.inria.fr)
- Computer Failure Data Repository from LANL (http://institutes.lanl.gov/data/fdata)



After infant mortality and before aging, instantaneous failure rate of computer platforms is almost constant

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- 1 Introduction
- Checkpointing
 - Coordinated checkpointingYoung/Daly's approximation
 - Exponential distributions
 - Assessing protocols at scale
 - In-memory checkpointing
 - Failure Prediction
 - Replication
- ABFT for dense linear algebra kernels
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- Checkpointing
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Goal

- General Purpose Fault Tolerance Techniques: work despite the application behavior
- Two adversaries: Failures & Application
- Use automatically computed redundant information
 - At given instants: checkpoints
 - At any instant: replication
 - Or anything in between: checkpoint + message logging

Process checkpointing

Goal

- Save the current state of the process
 - FT Protocols save a *possible* state of the parallel application

Techniques

- User-level checkpointing
- System-level checkpointing
- Blocking call
- Asynchronous call



System-level checkpointing

Blocking checkpointing

Relatively intuitive: checkpoint(filename)

Cost: no process activity during whole checkpoint operation

- Different implementations: OS syscall; dynamic library; compiler assisted
- Create a serial file that can be loaded in a process image.
 Usually on same architecture / OS / software environment
- Entirely transparent
- Preemptive (often needed for library-level checkpointing)
- Lack of portability
- Large size of checkpoint (≈ memory footprint)

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Storage

Remote reliable storage

Intuitive. I/O intensive. Disk usage.

Memory hierarchy

- local memory
- local disk (SSD, HDD)
- remote disk
 - Scalable Checkpoint Restart Library http://scalablecr.sourceforge.net


Checkpoint is valid when finished on reliable storage

Distributed memory storage

- In-memory checkpointing
- Disk-less checkpointing

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ABFT




Definition (Missing Message)

A message is missing if in the current configuration, the sender sent it, while the receiver did not receive it

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
Coordinated checkpointing



Definition (Orphan Message)

A message is orphan if in the current configuration, the receiver received it, while the sender did not send it

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


Create a consistent view of the application (no orphan messages)

- Messages belong to a checkpoint wave or another
- All communication channels must be flushed (all2all)

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Coordinated checkpointing



ABFT


- Silences the network during checkpoint
- Missing messages recorded

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Outline

- Checkpointing
 - Coordinated checkpointing
 - Young/Daly's approximation Exponential distributions
 - Assessing protocols at scale
 - In-memory checkpointing
 - Failure Prediction
 - Replication





Blocking model: while a checkpoint is taken, no computation can be performed




- Periodic checkpointing policy of period T
- Independent and identically distributed failures
- Applies to a single processor with MTBF $\mu = \mu_{ind}$
- Applies to a platform with p processors and MTBF $\mu = \frac{\mu_{ind}}{p}$
 - coordinated checkpointing
 - tightly-coupled application
 - progress ⇔ all processors available
 - ⇒ platform = single (powerful, unreliable) processor ©

Waste: fraction of time not spent for useful computations

Waste in fault-free execution

Checkpointing



- TIME_{base}: application base time
- TIME_{FF}: with periodic checkpoints but failure-free

$$TIME_{\mathsf{FF}} = TIME_{\mathsf{base}} + \#\mathit{checkpoints} \times C$$

$$\# \textit{checkpoints} = \left\lceil \frac{\mathrm{TIME_{base}}}{T-C} \right\rceil pprox \frac{\mathrm{TIME_{base}}}{T-C}$$
 (valid for large jobs)

$$Waste[FF] = \frac{TIME_{FF} - TIME_{base}}{TIME_{FF}} = \frac{C}{T}$$

Waste due to failures

- TIME_{base}: application base time
- TIMEFF: with periodic checkpoints but failure-free
- TIMEfinal: expectation of time with failures

$$TIME_{final} = TIME_{FF} + N_{faults} \times T_{lost}$$

 N_{faults} number of failures during execution T_{lost} : average time lost per failure

$$N_{faults} = \frac{\text{TIME}_{\text{final}}}{\mu}$$

$$T_{lost}$$
?



Waste due to failures

- TIME_{base}: application base time
- TIMEFF: with periodic checkpoints but failure-free
- TIMEfinal: expectation of time with failures


$$TIME_{final} = TIME_{FF} + N_{faults} \times T_{lost}$$

 N_{faults} number of failures during execution T_{lost} : average time lost per failure

$$\textit{N}_{\textit{faults}} = rac{ ext{TIME}_{ ext{final}}}{\mu}$$

$$T_{lost}$$
?





$$T_{\text{lost}} = D + R + \frac{T}{2}$$

Rationale

- \Rightarrow Instants when periods begin and failures strike are independent
- ⇒ Approximation used for all distribution laws
- ⇒ Exact for Exponential and uniform distributions

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$$TIME_{final} = TIME_{FF} + N_{faults} \times T_{lost}$$

$$\text{WASTE}[\textit{fail}] = \frac{\text{TIME}_{\mathsf{final}} - \text{TIME}_{\mathsf{FF}}}{\text{TIME}_{\mathsf{final}}} = \frac{1}{\mu} \left(D + R + \frac{T}{2} \right)$$



Total waste



$$Waste = \frac{Time_{final} - Time_{base}}{Time_{final}}$$

$$1 - \text{Waste} = (1 - \text{Waste}[FF])(1 - \text{Waste}[fail])$$

Waste
$$= \frac{C}{T} + \left(1 - \frac{C}{T}\right) \frac{1}{\mu} \left(D + R + \frac{T}{2}\right)$$



$\begin{aligned} \text{WASTE} &= \frac{C}{T} + \left(1 - \frac{C}{T}\right) \frac{1}{\mu} \left(D + R + \frac{T}{2}\right) \\ \text{WASTE} &= \frac{u}{T} + v + wT \\ u &= C\left(1 - \frac{D + R}{\mu}\right) \qquad v = \frac{D + R - C/2}{\mu} \qquad w = \frac{1}{2\mu} \end{aligned}$

Waste minimized for
$$T = \sqrt{\frac{u}{w}}$$

$$T = \sqrt{2(\mu - (D+R))C}$$

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$$(1 - \text{Waste}[fail]) \text{Time}_{final} = \text{Time}_{FF}$$

 $\Rightarrow T = \sqrt{2(\mu - (D + R))C}$

Daly: TIME_{final} =
$$(1 + \text{WASTE}[fail])$$
TIME_{FF}
 $\Rightarrow T = \sqrt{2(\mu + (D + R))C} + C$

Young: TIME_{final} =
$$(1 + \text{WASTE}[fail])$$
TIME_{FF} and $D = R = 0$
 $\Rightarrow T = \sqrt{2\mu C} + C$

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Validity of the approach (1/3)

Checkpointing

Technicalities

- $\mathbb{E}(N_{faults}) = \frac{\text{TiME}_{final}}{u}$ and $\mathbb{E}(T_{lost}) = D + R + \frac{T}{2}$ but expectation of product is not product of expectations (not independent RVs here)
- Enforce C < T to get WASTE[FF] < 1
- Enforce $D + R < \mu$ and bound T to get WASTE[fail] < 1 but $\mu = \frac{\mu_{ind}}{p}$ too small for large p, regardless of μ_{ind}



Validity of the approach (2/3)

Checkpointing

Several failures within same period?

- Waste[fail] accurate only when two or more faults do not take place within same period
- Cap period: $T \leq \gamma \mu$, where γ is some tuning parameter
 - Poisson process of parameter $\theta = \frac{1}{\mu}$
 - Probability of having $k \ge 0$ failures : $P(X = k) = \frac{\theta^k}{k!} e^{-\theta}$
 - Probability of having two or more failures:

$$\pi = P(X \ge 2) = 1 - (P(X = 0) + P(X = 1)) = 1 - (1 + \theta)e^{-\theta}$$

- $\gamma = 0.27 \Rightarrow \pi < 0.03$
 - \Rightarrow overlapping faults for only 3% of checkpointing segments

Validity of the approach (3/3)

• Enforce $T \leq \gamma \mu$, $C \leq \gamma \mu$, and $D + R \leq \gamma \mu$

• Optimal period $\sqrt{2(\mu-(D+R))C}$ may not belong to admissible interval $[C,\gamma\mu]$

 Waste is then minimized for one of the bounds of this admissible interval (by convexity) Capping periods, and enforcing a lower bound on MTBF
 ⇒ mandatory for mathematical rigor

- Not needed for practical purposes ©
 - actual job execution uses optimal value
 - account for multiple faults by re-executing work until success

• Approach surprisingly robust ©



Lesson learnt for fail-stop failures

(Not so) Secret data

- Tsubame 2: 962 failures during last 18 months so $\mu = 13$ hrs
- Blue Waters: 2-3 node failures per day
- Titan: a few failures per day
- Tianhe 2: wouldn't say

$$T_{
m opt} = \sqrt{2\mu C} \quad \Rightarrow \quad {
m WASTE}[opt] \approx \sqrt{\frac{2C}{\mu}}$$

Petascale: $C = 20 \text{ min } \mu = 24 \text{ hrs} \Rightarrow \text{WASTE}[opt] = 17\%$ Scale by 10: $C = 20 \text{ min } \mu = 2.4 \text{ hrs } \Rightarrow \text{WASTE}[opt] = 53\%$ Scale by 100: C = 20 min $\mu = 0.24 \text{ hrs}$ \Rightarrow Waste[opt] = 100%

Lesson learnt for fail-stop failures

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- Tsuban. 062 failures during last 18 months so
- Blue Waters: 2- de failures per day
- Titan: a few failures per
- ullet Tianhe Exascale eq Petascale imes 1000Need more reliable components Need to checkpoint faster

```
C = 20 \text{ min } \mu = 24 \text{ hrs} \Rightarrow \text{WATE}[opt] = 17\%
Petascal
Scale 10: C = 20 \text{ min } \mu = 2.4 \text{ hrs} \Rightarrow \text{WAS}[opt] = 53\%
Scalar 100: C = 20 \text{ min } \mu = 0.24 \text{ hrs } \Rightarrow \text{Waste} [t] = 100\%
```

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Lesson learnt for fail-stop failures

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```
Silent errors:
```

detection latency \Rightarrow additional problems

```
C=20 \text{ min} \mu=24 \text{ hrs}
Petascale:
                                                        \Rightarrow Waste[opt] = 17%
                                                        \Rightarrow \text{Waste}[opt] = 53\%
Scale by 10: C = 20 \text{ min} \mu = 2.4 \text{ hrs}
Scale by 100: C = 20 \text{ min} \mu = 0.24 \text{ hrs}
                                                        \Rightarrow Waste[opt] = 100%
```

Silent Errors

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Exponential failure distribution

- Expected execution time for a single chunk
- Expected execution time for a sequential job
- Expected execution time for a parallel job



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Fault-tolerance for HPC

Expected execution time for a single chunk

Compute the expected time $\mathbb{E}(T(W,C,D,R,\lambda))$ to execute a work of duration W followed by a checkpoint of duration C.

$$\mathbb{E}(T(W)) =$$



Expected execution time for a single chunk

Compute the expected time $\mathbb{E}(T(W,C,D,R,\lambda))$ to execute a work of duration W followed by a checkpoint of duration C.

$$\mathbb{E}(T(W)) = \frac{\Pr{\text{obability}}}{\Pr{\text{succ}(W+C)}(W+C)}$$

Compute the expected time $\mathbb{E}(T(W,C,D,R,\lambda))$ to execute a work of duration W followed by a checkpoint of duration C.

Recursive Approach

Time needed to compute the work W and checkpoint it

$$\mathcal{P}_{\text{succ}}(W+C)(W+C)$$

$$\mathbb{E}(T(W)) =$$

Expected execution time for a single chunk

Compute the expected time $\mathbb{E}(T(W,C,D,R,\lambda))$ to execute a work of duration W followed by a checkpoint of duration C.

$$\mathbb{E}(T(W)) = \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{P}_{\text{succ}}(W+C)(W+C) \\ + \\ \underbrace{\left(1 - \mathcal{P}_{\text{succ}}(W+C)\right)\left(\mathbb{E}(T_{lost}(W+C)) + \mathbb{E}(T_{rec}) + \mathbb{E}(T(W))\right)}_{\text{Probability of failure}} \end{array}$$

Compute the expected time $\mathbb{E}(T(W, C, D, R, \lambda))$ to execute a work of duration W followed by a checkpoint of duration C.

$$\mathcal{P}_{\text{succ}}(W+C)(W+C)$$

$$\mathbb{E}(T(W)) = +$$

$$(1 - \mathcal{P}_{\text{succ}}(W+C)) \underbrace{(\mathbb{E}(T_{lost}(W+C)) + \mathbb{E}(T_{rec}) + \mathbb{E}(T(W)))}_{\text{Time elapsed before failure stroke}}$$

Expected execution time for a single chunk

Compute the expected time $\mathbb{E}(T(W,C,D,R,\lambda))$ to execute a work of duration W followed by a checkpoint of duration C.

$$\mathcal{P}_{\mathrm{succ}}(W+C)(W+C)$$
 $\mathbb{E}(T(W)) = + (1-\mathcal{P}_{\mathrm{succ}}(W+C))(\mathbb{E}(T_{lost}(W+C)) + \mathbb{E}(T_{rec}) + \mathbb{E}(T(W)))$
Time needed to perform downtime and recovery

Expected execution time for a single chunk

Compute the expected time $\mathbb{E}(T(W,C,D,R,\lambda))$ to execute a work of duration W followed by a checkpoint of duration C.

Recursive Approach

$$egin{aligned} & \mathcal{P}_{ ext{succ}}(W+C)\,(W+C) \ & \mathbb{E}(T(W)) = & + \ & \left(1-\mathcal{P}_{ ext{succ}}(W+C)
ight)(\mathbb{E}(T_{lost}(W+C))+\mathbb{E}(T_{rec})+\mathbb{E}(T(W))) \ & ext{Time needed} \end{aligned}$$

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to compute W
anew

ARFT

$$\begin{split} &\mathcal{P}_{\text{succ}}(W+C)(W+C)\\ &\mathbb{E}(T(W)) = & + \\ & \left(1-\mathcal{P}_{\text{succ}}(W+C)\right)\left(\mathbb{E}(T_{lost}(W+C)) + \mathbb{E}(T_{rec}) + \mathbb{E}(T(W))\right) \end{split}$$

- $\mathbb{P}_{suc}(W+C)=e^{-\lambda(W+C)}$
- $\mathbb{E}(T_{lost}(W+C)) = \int_0^\infty x \mathbb{P}(X=x|X< W+C) dx = \frac{1}{\lambda} \frac{W+C}{e^{\lambda(W+C)}-1}$
- $\mathbb{E}(T_{rec}) = e^{-\lambda R}(D+R) + (1-e^{-\lambda R})(D+\mathbb{E}(T_{lost}(R)) + \mathbb{E}(T_{rec}))$

$$\mathbb{E}(T(W,C,D,R,\lambda)) = e^{\lambda R} \left(\frac{1}{\lambda} + D\right) \left(e^{\lambda(W+C)} - 1\right)$$

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Checkpointing a sequential job

- $\mathbb{E}(T(W)) = e^{\lambda R} \left(\frac{1}{\lambda} + D\right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^{K} e^{\lambda(W_i + C)} 1\right)$
- Optimal strategy uses same-size chunks (convexity)
- $K_0=rac{\lambda W}{1+\mathbb{L}(-e^{-\lambda C-1})}$ where $\mathbb{L}(z)e^{\mathbb{L}(z)}=z$ (Lambert function)
- ullet Optimal number of chunks K^* is $\max(1, \lfloor K_0 \rfloor)$ or $\lceil K_0 \rceil$

$$\mathbb{E}_{opt}(T(W)) = K^* \left(e^{\lambda R} \left(\frac{1}{\lambda} + D \right) \right) \left(e^{\lambda \left(\frac{W}{K^*} + C \right)} - 1 \right)$$

• Can also use Daly's second-order approximation

Checkpointing a parallel job

- p processors \Rightarrow distribution $Exp(\lambda_p)$, where $\lambda_p = p\lambda$
- Use W(p), C(p), R(p) in $\mathbb{E}_{opt}(T(W))$ for a distribution $Exp(\lambda_p = p\lambda)$
- Job types
 - Perfectly parallel jobs: W(p) = W/p.
 - Generic parallel jobs: $W(p) = W/p + \delta W$
 - Numerical kernels: $W(p) = W/p + \delta W^{2/3}/\sqrt{p}$
- Checkpoint overhead
 - Proportional overhead: $C(p) = R(p) = \delta V/p = C/p$ (bandwidth of processor network card/link is I/O bottleneck)
 - Constant overhead: $C(p) = R(p) = \delta V = C$ (bandwidth to/from resilient storage system is I/O bottleneck)



Weibull failure distribution

- No optimality result known
- Heuristic: maximize expected work before next failure

ABFT

- Dynamic programming algorithms
 - Use a time quantum
 - Trim history of previous failures




Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Checkpointing
 - Coordinated checkpointing
 - Young/Daly's approximationExponential distributions
 - Assessing protocols at scale
 - In-memory checkpointing
 - In-memory checkpointil
 - Failure Prediction
 - Replication
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- 4 Silent error
- 5 Conclusion



Hierarchical checkpointing

- Clusters of processes
- Coordinated checkpointing protocol within clusters
- Message logging protocols between clusters
- Only processors from failed group need to roll back



- Need to log inter-groups messages
 - Slowdowns failure-free execution
 - Increases checkpoint size/time
- Faster re-execution with logged messages



Which checkpointing protocol to use?

Coordinated checkpointing


Checkpointing

- © No risk of cascading rollbacks
- © No need to log messages
- ② All processors need to roll back
- © Rumor: May not scale to very large platforms

Hierarchical checkpointing

- Need to log inter-groups messages
 - Slowdowns failure-free execution
 - Increases checkpoint size/time
- Only processors from failed group need to roll back
- © Faster re-execution with logged messages
- © Rumor: Should scale to very large platforms







Blocking model: checkpointing blocks all computations



Blocking vs. non-blocking




Non-blocking model: checkpointing has no impact on computations (e.g., first copy state to RAM, then copy RAM to disk)



General model: checkpointing slows computations down: during a checkpoint of duration C, the same amount of computation is done as during a time αC without checkpointing $(0 \le \alpha \le 1)$

Waste in fault-free execution




Time elapsed since last checkpoint: T

Amount of computations executed: WORK = $(T - C) + \alpha C$

$$Waste[FF] = \frac{T - Work}{T}$$

Waste due to failures




ABFT

Failure can happen

- During computation phase
- Ouring checkpointing phase

 Time spent working
 Time spent checkpointing
 Time spent working with slowdown Time P_2

Waste due to failures




Checkpointing



Coordinated checkpointing protocol: when one processor is victim of a failure, all processors lose their work and must roll back to last checkpoint






ABFT

Coordinated checkpointing protocol: all processors must recover from last checkpoint


Waste due to failures in computation phase



Redo the work destroyed by the failure, that was done in the checkpointing phase before the computation phase

But no checkpoint is taken in parallel, hence this re-execution is faster than the original computation






ABFT

Re-execute the computation phase


Checkpointing



Finally, the checkpointing phase is executed

Total waste


Checkpointing



Waste[fail] =
$$\frac{1}{\mu} \left(D + R + \alpha C + \frac{T}{2} \right)$$

Optimal period
$$T_{\text{opt}} = \sqrt{2(1-\alpha)(\mu - (D+R+\alpha C))C}$$





- Processors partitioned into G groups
- Each group includes q processors
- ullet Inside each group: coordinated checkpointing in time C(q)
- Inter-group messages are logged



Accounting for message logging: Impact on work

- Elements
 Under the Logging messages slows down execution:
 - \Rightarrow WORK becomes λ WORK, where $0 < \lambda < 1$ Typical value: $\lambda \approx 0.98$
- © Re-execution after a failure is faster:
 - \Rightarrow RE-EXEC becomes $\frac{\text{RE-EXEC}}{\rho}$, where $\rho \in [1..2]$ Typical value: $\rho \approx 1.5$

$$ext{WASTE}[FF] = rac{T - \lambda ext{WORK}}{T}$$
 $ext{WASTE}[\mathit{fail}] = rac{1}{\mu} igg(D(q) + R(q) + rac{ ext{Re-Exec}}{
ho} igg)$

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Silent Errors

Accounting for message logging: Impact on checkpoint size

- Inter-groups messages logged continuously
- Checkpoint size increases with amount of work executed before a checkpoint ©
- $C_0(q)$: Checkpoint size of a group without message logging

$$C(q) = C_0(q)(1 + \beta \text{WORK}) \Leftrightarrow \beta = \frac{C(q) - C_0(q)}{C_0(q) \text{WORK}}$$

WORK =
$$\lambda (T - (1 - \alpha)GC(q))$$

$$C(q) = \frac{C_0(q)(1 + \beta \lambda T)}{1 + GC_0(q)\beta\lambda(1 - \alpha)}$$

Three case studies

Checkpointing

Coord-IO

Coordinated approach: $C = C_{Mem} = \frac{Mem}{h_{\odot}}$ where Mem is the memory footprint of the application

Hierarch-IO

Several (large) groups, I/O-saturated ⇒ groups checkpoint sequentially

$$C_0(q) = \frac{C_{\mathsf{Mem}}}{G} = \frac{\mathsf{Mem}}{G\mathsf{b}_{io}}$$

Hierarch-Port

Very large number of smaller groups, port-saturated ⇒ some groups checkpoint in parallel Groups of q_{min} processors, where $q_{min}b_{port} \geq b_{io}$

- 2D-stencil
- Matrix product
- 3D-Stencil
 - Plane
 - Line

Computing β for 2D-Stencil

Checkpointing

$$C(q) = C_0(q) + Logged_Msg = C_0(q)(1 + \beta WORK)$$

Real $n \times n$ matrix and $p \times p$ grid

Work =
$$\frac{9b^2}{5a}$$
, $b = n/p$

Each process sends a block to its 4 neighbors


HIERARCH-IO:

- 1 group = 1 grid row
- 2 out of the 4 messages are logged

•
$$\beta = \frac{Logged_Msg}{C_0(q)WORK} = \frac{2pb}{pb^2(9b^2/s_p)} = \frac{2s_p}{9b^3}$$

HIERARCH-PORT:

β doubles



Four platforms: basic characteristics

Name	Number of	Number of	Number of cores	Memory	I/O Network Bandwidth (bio)		I/O Bandwidth (bport)
	cores	processors p _{total}	per processor	per processor	Read	Write	Read/Write per processor
Titan	299,008	16,688	16	32GB	300GB/s	300GB/s	20GB/s
K-Computer	705,024	88,128	8	16GB	150GB/s	96GB/s	20GB/s
Exascale-Slim	1,000,000,000	1,000,000	1,000	64GB	1TB/s	1TB/s	200GB/s
Exascale-Fat	1,000,000,000	100,000	10,000	640GB	1TB/s	1TB/s	400GB/s

Name	Scenario	G(C(q))	β for	β for	
			2D-Stencil	Matrix-Product	
	Coord-IO	1 (2,048s)	/	/	
Titan	Hierarch-IO	136 (15s)	0.0001098	0.0004280	
	HIERARCH-PORT	1,246 (1.6s)	0.0002196	0.0008561	
	Coord-IO	1 (14,688s)	/	/	
K-Computer	Hierarch-IO	296 (50s)	0.0002858	0.001113	
	HIERARCH-PORT	17,626 (0.83s)	0.0005716	0.002227	
	Coord-IO	1 (64,000s)	/	/	
Exascale-Slim	Hierarch-IO	1,000 (64s)	0.0002599	0.001013	
	HIERARCH-PORT	200,0000 (0.32s)	0.0005199	0.002026	
	Coord-IO	1 (64,000s)	/	/	
Exascale-Fat	HIERARCH-IO	316 (217s)	0.00008220	0.0003203	
	HIERARCH-PORT	33,3333 (1.92s)	0.00016440	0.0006407	



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Checkpoint time

Checkpointing


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Name	С		
K-Computer	14,688s		
Exascale-Slim	64,000		
Exascale-Fat	64,000		

- Large time to dump the memory
- Using 1%*C*
- Comparing with 0.1% C for exascale platforms
- \bullet $\alpha = 0.3$, $\lambda = 0.98$ and $\rho = 1.5$

ABFT


Plotting formulas – Platform: Titan



Waste as a function of processor MTBF μ_{ind}

Checkpointing

Platform: K-Computer



Waste as a function of processor MTBF μ_{ind}


Plotting formulas – Platform: Exascale

WASTE = 1 for all scenarios!!!




ABFT

Plotting formulas – Platform: Exascale with C = 1,000




Waste as a function of processor MTBF μ_{ind} , $\mathit{C}=1,000$

Yves.Robert@inria.fr Fault-tolerance for HPC 72 / 129




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Makespan (in days) as a function of processor MTBF μ_{ind}


Simulations – Platform: Exascale with C = 1,000



Makespan (in days) as a function of processor MTBF μ_{ind} , C=1,000

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Simulations – Platform: Exascale with C=100



Makespan (in days) as a function of processor MTBF μ_{ind} , C=100

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Outline

- - Checkpointing
 - Coordinated checkpointing
 - Young/Daly's approximation Exponential distributions
 - Assessing protocols at scale
 - In-memory checkpointing
 - Failure Prediction
 - Replication



Motivation


- Checkpoint transfer and storage
 - ⇒ critical issues of rollback/recovery protocols

Stable storage: high cost

Checkpointing

- Distributed in-memory storage:
 - Store checkpoints in local memory ⇒ no centralized storage Much better scalability
 - Replicate checkpoints ⇒ application survives single failure © Still, risk of fatal failure in some (unlikely) scenarios

Double checkpoint algorithm (Kale et al., UIUC)




- Platform nodes partitioned into pairs
- Each node in a pair exchanges its checkpoint with its buddy
- Each node saves two checkpoints:
 - one locally: storing its own data
 - one remotely: receiving and storing its buddy's data



Checkpointing

Node p Node p' Checkpoint of Checkpoint of σ Node to replace p

- After failure: downtime D and recovery from buddy node
- Two checkpoint files lost, must be re-sent to faulty processor



- After failure: downtime D and recovery from buddy node
- Two checkpoint files lost, must be re-sent to faulty processor
- Application at risk until complete reception of both messages

Best trade-off between performance and risk?

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Checkpointing

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Checkpointing
 - Coordinated checkpointingYoung/Daly's approximation
 - Young/Daily's approximate
 Exponential distributions
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- ABFT for dense linear algebra kernels
- 4 Silent errors
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Framework

Predictor

- Exact prediction dates (at least C seconds in advance)
- Recall r: fraction of faults that are predicted
- Precision p: fraction of fault predictions that are correct

Events

- true positive: predicted faults
- false positive: fault predictions that did not materialize as actual faults
- false negative: unpredicted faults




it rates

Checkpointing

- μ : mean time between failures (MTBF)
- μ_P mean time between predicted events (both true positive and false positive)
- ullet μ_{NP} mean time between unpredicted faults (false negative).
- \bullet μ_e : mean time between events (including three event types)

$$r=rac{True_P}{True_P+False_N} \quad ext{and} \quad p=rac{True_P}{True_P+False_P}$$
 $rac{\left(1-r
ight)}{\mu}=rac{1}{\mu_{NP}} \quad ext{and} \quad rac{r}{\mu}=rac{p}{\mu_P}$ $rac{1}{\mu_P}=rac{1}{\mu_P}+rac{1}{\mu_{NP}}$



- Predictor predicts six faults in time t
- Five actual faults. One fault not predicted
- $\mu = \frac{t}{5}$, $\mu_P = \frac{t}{6}$, and $\mu_{NP} = t$
- Recall $r = \frac{4}{5}$ (green arrows over red arrows)
- Precision $p = \frac{4}{6}$ (green arrows over blue arrows)

- While no fault prediction is available:
 - checkpoints taken periodically with period T
- When a fault is predicted at time t:
 - take a checkpoint ALAP (completion right at time t)
 - after the checkpoint, complete the execution of the period


ABFT

Computing the waste


1 Fault-free execution: Waste[FF] = $\frac{C}{T}$




2 Unpredicted faults: $\frac{1}{\mu_{NP}} \left[D + R + \frac{T}{2} \right]$



3 Predictions: $\frac{1}{n_D} \left[p(C + D + R) + (1 - p)C \right]$



with actual fault (true positive)



no actual fault (false negative)

Waste[fail] =
$$\frac{1}{\mu} \left[(1-r)\frac{T}{2} + D + R + \frac{r}{\rho}C \right] \Rightarrow T_{opt} \approx \sqrt{\frac{2\mu C}{1-r}}$$


Refinements

- Use different value C_p for proactive checkpoints
- Avoid checkpointing too frequently for false negatives
 - \Rightarrow Only trust predictions with some fixed probability q
 - \Rightarrow Ignore predictions with probability 1-a

Conclusion: trust predictor always or never (q = 0 or q = 1)

- Trust prediction depending upon position in current period
 - \Rightarrow Increase q when progressing
 - \Rightarrow Break-even point $\frac{c_p}{p}$

With prediction windows



Gets too complicated! ©



Silent Errors

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- ADF I for dense linear algebra kernel
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


Replication

- Systematic replication: efficiency < 50%
- Can replication+checkpointing be more efficient than checkpointing alone?
- Study by Ferreira et al. [SC'2011]: yes

- Parallel application comprising N processes
- Platform with $p_{total} = 2N$ processors
- Each process replicated → N replica-groups
- When a replica is hit by a failure, it is not restarted
- Application fails when both replicas in one replica-group have been hit by failures

Example



The birthday problem

Checkpointing

Classical formulation

What is the probability, in a set of m people, that two of them have same birthday?

Relevant formulation

What is the average number of people required to find a pair with same birthday?

Birthday(m) =
$$1 + \int_0^{+\infty} e^{-x} (1 + x/m)^{m-1} dx = \frac{2}{3} + \sqrt{\frac{\pi m}{2}} + \sqrt{\frac{\pi}{288m}} - \frac{4}{135m} + \dots$$

The analogy


Two people with same birthday



Two failures hitting same replica-group



- 2N processors but N processes, each replicated twice
- Uniform distribution of failures
- First failure: each replica-group has probability 1/N to be hit
- Second failure



- 2N processors but N processes, each replicated twice
- Uniform distribution of failures
- ullet First failure: each replica-group has probability 1/N to be hit
- Second failure

Ν

Checkpointing



- 2N processors but N processes, each replicated twice
- Uniform distribution of failures
- First failure: each replica-group has probability 1/N to be hit
- Second failure: can failed PE be hit?

Differences with birthday problem







- 2N processors but N processes, each replicated twice
- Uniform distribution of failures
- First failure: each replica-group has probability 1/N to be hit
- Second failure cannot hit failed PE
 - Failure uniformly distributed over 2N 1 PEs
 - Probability that replica-group i is hit by failure: 1/(2N-1)
 - Probability that replica-group $\neq i$ is hit by failure: 2/(2N-1)
 - Failure not uniformly distributed over replica-groups:



- 2N processors but N processes, each replicated twice
- Uniform distribution of failures
- First failure: each replica-group has probability 1/N to be hit
- Second failure cannot hit failed PE
 - Failure uniformly distributed over 2N 1 PEs
 - Probability that replica-group i is hit by failure: 1/(2N-1)
 - Probability that replica-group $\neq i$ is hit by failure: 2/(2N-1)
 - Failure not uniformly distributed over replica-groups:



Differences with birthday problem

Checkpointing









Conclusion

- 2N processors but N processes, each replicated twice
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Differences with birthday problem









Ν

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 - If failure hits running PE: application killed
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Differences with birthday problem



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


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Correct analogy




 $N = n_{rg}$ bins, red and blue balls

Mean Number of Failures to Interruption (bring down application) MNFTI = expected number of balls to throw until one bin gets one ball of each color

Number of failures to bring down application

- MNFTI^{ah} Count each failure hitting any of the initial processors, including those *already hit* by a failure
- MNFTI^{rp} Count failures that hit *running processors*, and thus effectively kill replicas.

$$MNFTI^{\mathrm{ah}} = 1 + MNFTI^{\mathrm{rp}}$$



Number of failures to bring down application

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Exponential failures

Checkpointing

Theorem $MNFTI^{ah} = \mathbb{E}(NFTI^{ah}|0)$ where

$$\mathbb{E}(\textit{NFTI}^{\mathrm{ah}}|\textit{n}_f) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 2 & \text{if } \textit{n}_f = \textit{n}_{\textit{rg}}, \\ \frac{2\textit{n}_{\textit{rg}} - \textit{n}_f}{2\textit{n}_{\textit{rg}} - \textit{n}_f} + \frac{2\textit{n}_{\textit{rg}} - 2\textit{n}_f}{2\textit{n}_{\textit{rg}} - \textit{n}_f} \, \mathbb{E}\left(\textit{NFTI}^{\mathrm{ah}}|\textit{n}_f + 1\right) & \text{otherwise}. \end{array} \right.$$

 $\mathbb{E}(NFTI^{\mathrm{ah}}|n_f)$: expectation of number of failures to kill application, knowing that

- application is still running
- failures have already hit n_f different replica-groups

Exponential failures (cont'd)

Proof

$$\mathbb{E}\left(\textit{NFTI}^{\mathrm{ah}}\left|\textit{n}_{\textit{rg}}\right.\right) = \frac{1}{2} \times 1 + \frac{1}{2} \times \left(1 + \mathbb{E}\left(\textit{NFTI}^{\mathrm{ah}}\left|\textit{n}_{\textit{rg}}\right.\right)\right).$$

$$\mathbb{E}\left(NFTI^{\mathrm{ah}}|n_{f}\right) = \frac{2n_{rg} - 2n_{f}}{2n_{rg}} \times \left(1 + \mathbb{E}\left(NFTI^{\mathrm{ah}}|n_{f} + 1\right)\right) + \frac{2n_{f}}{2n_{rg}} \times \left(\frac{1}{2} \times 1 + \frac{1}{2}\left(1 + \mathbb{E}\left(NFTI^{\mathrm{ah}}|n_{f}\right)\right)\right)$$

Proof

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Exponential failures (cont'd)

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$$\begin{split} \mathbb{E}\left(\textit{NFTI}^{\mathrm{ah}}|\textit{n}_{\textit{f}}\right) &= \frac{2\textit{n}_{\textit{rg}} - 2\textit{n}_{\textit{f}}}{2\textit{n}_{\textit{rg}}} \times \left(1 + \mathbb{E}\left(\textit{NFTI}^{\mathrm{ah}}|\textit{n}_{\textit{f}} + 1\right)\right) \\ &+ \frac{2\textit{n}_{\textit{f}}}{2\textit{n}_{\textit{rg}}} \times \left(\frac{1}{2} \times 1 + \frac{1}{2}\left(1 + \mathbb{E}\left(\textit{NFTI}^{\mathrm{ah}}|\textit{n}_{\textit{f}}\right)\right)\right). \end{split}$$


 $MTTI = systemMTBF(2n_{rg}) \times MNFTI^{ah}$


Comparison

- 2N processors, no replication THROUGHPUT_{Std} = $2N(1 - \text{WASTE}) = 2N\left(1 - \sqrt{\frac{2C}{\mu_{2N}}}\right)$
- N replica-pairs $ext{Throughput}_{\mathsf{Rep}} = extstyle N \left(1 - \sqrt{rac{2C}{\mu_{\mathsf{rep}}}}
 ight)$ $\mu_{\mathsf{rep}} = \mathsf{MNFTI} \times \mu_{\mathsf{2N}} = \mathsf{MNFTI} \times \frac{\mu}{\mathsf{2N}}$
- Platform with $2N = 2^{20}$ processors $\Rightarrow MNFTI = 1284.4$ $\mu = 10 \text{ years} \Rightarrow \text{better if } C \text{ shorter than 6 minutes}$

Failure distribution

Checkpointing





(a) Exponential


(b) Weibull, k = 0.7

Crossover point for replication when $\mu_{ind} = 125$ years

Weibull distribution with k = 0.7

Checkpointing

Dashed line: Ferreira et al. Solid line: Correct analogy



- Study by Ferrreira et al. favors replication
- Replication beneficial if small μ + large C + big p_{total}

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Checkpointing
- ABFT for dense linear algebra kernels
- 4 Silent error
- 5 Conclusion

Forward-Recovery

Backward Recovery

- Rollback / Backward Recovery: returns in the history to recover from failures.
- Spends time to re-execute computations
- Rebuilds states already reached
- Typical: checkpointing techniques



Forward-Recovery

Checkpointing


Forward Recovery

- Forward Recovery: proceeds without returning.
- Pays additional costs during (failure-free) computation to maintain consistent redundancy
- Or pays additional computations when failures happen
- General technique: Replication
- Application-Specific techniques: Iterative algorithms with fixed point convergence, ABFT, ...

Tiled LU factorization




Failure of rank 2



- 2D Block Cyclic Distribution (here 2 × 3)
- A single failure ⇒ many data lost




Algorithm Based Fault Tolerant LU decomposition



- Checksum: invertible operation on row/column data
 - Key idea of ABFT: applying the operation on data and checksum preserves the checksum properties

Performance



MPI-Next ULFM Performance

Open MPI with ULFM; Kraken supercomputer;



Outline

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Definitions

- Instantaneous error detection ⇒ fail-stop failures,
 e.g. resource crash
- Silent errors (data corruption) ⇒ detection latency

Silent error detected only when the corrupt data is activated

ABFT

- Includes some software faults, some hardware errors (soft errors in L1 cache), double bit flip
- Cannot always be corrected by ECC memory



Silent Errors

- Soft Error: An unintended change in the state of an electronic device that alters the information that it stores without destroying its functionality, e.g. a bit flip caused by a cosmic-ray-induced neutron. (Hengartner et al., 2008)
- SDC occurs when incorrect data is delivered by a computing system to the user without any error being logged (Cristian Constantinescu, AMD)
- Silent errors are the black swan of errors (Marc Snir)

Checkpointing

Should we be afraid? (courtesy Al Geist)

Fear of the Unknown

Hard errors – permanent component failure either HW or SW (hung or crash)

Transient errors -a blip or short term failure of either HW or SW

Silent errors – undetected errors either hard or soft, due to lack of detectors for a component or inability to detect (transient effect too short). Real danger is that answer may be incorrect but the user wouldn't know.

Statistically, silent error rates are increasing. Are they really? Its fear of the unknown

Are silent errors really a problem or just monsters under our bed?



Yves.Robert@inria.fr Fault-tolerance for HPC 110/ 129



Theorem:
$$\mu_p = \frac{\mu_{\text{ind}}}{p}$$
 for arbitrary distributions




Theorem: $\mu_p = \frac{\mu_{\text{ind}}}{p}$ for arbitrary distributions

Silent Errors

General-purpose approach

Checkpointing



Error and detection latency


- Last checkpoint may have saved an already corrupted state
- Saving k checkpoints (Lu, Zheng and Chien):
 - ① Critical failure when all live checkpoints are invalid
 - 2 Which checkpoint to roll back to?



Silent Errors

General-purpose approach

Checkpointing



Error and detection latency

- Last checkpoint may have saved an already corrupted state
- Saving k checkpoints (Lu, Zheng and Chien):
 - ① Critical failure when all live checkpoints are invalid Assume unlimited storage resources
 - Which checkpoint to roll back to? Assume verification mechanism



Checkpointing

It is not clear how to detect when the error has occurred (hence to identify the last valid checkpoint) \odot \odot

Need a verification mechanism to check the correctness of the checkpoints. This has an additional cost!



- Verification mechanism of cost V
- Silent errors detected only when verification is executed
- Approach agnostic of the nature of verification mechanism (checksum, error correcting code, coherence tests, etc)
- Fully general-purpose (application-specific information, if available, can always be used to decrease V)

On-line ABFT scheme for PCG


```
1 : Compute r^{(0)} = b - Ax^{(0)}, z^{(0)} = M^{-1}r^{(0)}, p^{(0)} = z^{(0)},
       and 
ho_0 = r^{(0)} z^{(0)} for some initial guess x^{(0)}
2: checkpoint: A, M, and b
3 : for i = 0, 1, ...
           if ( (i>0) and (i\%d = 0)
5 :
                     recover: A, M, b, i, \rho_i,
6:
                                     p^{(i)}, x^{(i)}, \text{ and } r^{(i)}.
                else if ( i\%(cd) = 0 )
7:
                     checkpoint: i, \rho_i, p^{(i)}, and x^{(i)}
8:
9:
               endif
10:
           endif
           q^{(i)} = Ap^{(i)}
11:
           \alpha_i = \rho_i / p^{(i)}^T q^{(i)}
12:
           x^{(i+1)} = x^{(i)} + \alpha_i p^{(i)}
13:
           r^{(i+1)} = r^{(i)} - \alpha_i q^{(i)}
14:
            solve Mz^{(i+1)} = r^{(i+1)}, where M = M^T
15:
           \rho_{i+1} = r^{(i+1)T} z^{(i+1)}
16:
17:
           \beta_i = \rho_{i+1}/\rho_i
           p^{(i+1)} = z^{(i+1)} + \beta_i p^{(i)}
10:
19:
            check convergence; continue if necessary
20: end
```

Zizhong Chen, PPoPP'13

- Iterate PCG
 Cost: SpMV, preconditioner

 solve, 5 linear kernels
- Detect soft errors by checking orthogonality and residual
- Verification every d iterations
 Cost: scalar product+SpMV
- Checkpoint every c iterations
 Cost: three vectors, or two vectors + SpMV at recovery
- Experimental method to choose c and d






	Fail-stop (classical)	Silent errors
Pattern	T = W + C	S = W + V + C
Waste[<i>FF</i>]	<u>C</u> T	$\frac{V+C}{S}$
$\mathrm{Waste}[\mathit{fail}]$	$\frac{1}{\mu}(D+R+\frac{W}{2})$	$\frac{1}{\mu}(R+W+V)$
Optimal	$T_{\sf opt} = \sqrt{2C\mu}$	$S_{opt} = \sqrt{(C + V)\mu}$
$\text{Waste}[\mathit{opt}]$	$\sqrt{\frac{2C}{\mu}}$	$2\sqrt{\frac{C+V}{\mu}}$


Silent Errors

With p = 1 checkpoint and q = 3 verifications



Base Pattern
$$\left|\begin{array}{c|c}p=1,q=1\end{array}\right|$$
 WASTE $\left[opt\right]=2\sqrt{\frac{C+V}{\mu}}$ New Pattern $\left|\begin{array}{c|c}p=1,q=3\end{array}\right|$ WASTE $\left[opt\right]=2\sqrt{\frac{4(C+3V)}{6\mu}}$

BalancedAlgorithm




- p checkpoints and q verifications, p < q
- p = 2, q = 5, S = 2C + 5V + W
- W = 10w. six chunks of size w or 2w
- May store invalid checkpoint (error during third chunk)
- After successful verification in fourth chunk, preceding checkpoint is valid
- Keep only two checkpoints in memory and avoid any fatal failure




Checkpointing

BalancedAlgorithm



- ① (proba 2w/W) $T_{lost} = R + 2w + V$
- ② (proba 2w/W) $T_{lost} = R + 4w + 2V$
- 3 (proba w/W) $T_{lost} = 2R + 6w + C + 4V$
- **4** (proba w/W) $T_{lost} = R + w + 2V$
- **5** (proba 2w/W) $T_{lost} = R + 3w + 2V$
- 6 (proba 2w/W) $T_{lost} = R + 5w + 3V$

Waste[opt]
$$\approx 2\sqrt{\frac{7(2C+5V)}{20\mu}}$$



- BALANCEDALGORITHM optimal when $C, R, V \ll \mu$
- Keep only 2 checkpoints in memory/storage
- Closed-form formula for WASTE[opt]
- \bullet Given C and V, choose optimal pattern
- Gain of up to 20% over base pattern

Application-specific methods


- ABFT: dense matrices / fail-stop, extended to sparse / silent.
 Limited to one error detection and/or correction in practice
- Asynchronous (chaotic) iterative methods (old work)
- Partial differential equations: use lower-order scheme as verification mechanism (detection only, Benson, Schmit and Schreiber)
- FT-GMRES: inner-outer iterations (Hoemmen and Heroux)
- PCG: orthogonalization check every k iterations,
 re-orthogonalization if problem detected (Sao and Vuduc)
- ... Many others



Dynamic programming for linear chains of tasks

- $\{T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n\}$: linear chain of n tasks
- Each task T_i fully parametrized:
 - w_i computational weight
 - \bullet C_i, R_i, V_i : checkpoint, recovery, verification
- Error rates:
 - λ^F rate of fail-stop errors
 - λ^S rate of silent errors

Silent Errors



$$\min_{0 \le k < n} Time_C^{rec}(n, k)$$

$$\mathit{Time}^{\mathit{rec}}_{\mathit{C}}(j,k) = \min_{k \leq i < j} \{\mathit{Time}^{\mathit{rec}}_{\mathit{C}}(i,k-1) + \mathit{T}^{\mathit{SF}}_{\mathit{C}}(i+1,j)\}$$

$$\begin{split} T_{C}^{SF}(i,j) &= p_{i,j}^{F} \left(T_{lost_{i,j}} + R_{i-1} + T_{C}^{SF}(i,j) \right) \\ &+ \left(1 - p_{i,j}^{F} \right) \left(\sum_{\ell=i}^{j} w_{\ell} + V_{j} + p_{i,j}^{S} \left(R_{i-1} + T_{C}^{SF}(i,j) \right) + \left(1 - p_{i,j}^{S} \right) C_{j} \right) \end{split}$$



Extensions

- \bullet VC-ONLY and VC+V
- Different speeds with DVFS, different error rates
- Different execution modes
- Optimize for time or for energy consumption

Current research

- Use verification to correct some errors (ABFT)
- Imprecise verifications (a.k.a. recall and precision)



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A few questions

Silent errors

- Error rate? MTBE?
- Selective reliability?
- New algorithms beyond iterative? matrix-product, FFT, ...

Resilient research on resilience

Models needed to assess techniques at scale without bias ©



General Purpose Fault Tolerance

- Software/hardware techniques to reduce checkpoint, recovery, migration times and to improve failure prediction
- Multi-criteria scheduling problem execution time/energy/reliability add replication best resource usage (performance trade-offs)
- Need combine all these approaches!

Several challenging algorithmic/scheduling problems ©



Extended version of this talk: see SC'14 tutorial. Available at http://graal.ens-lyon.fr/~yrobert/

Yves.Robert@inria.fr Fault-tolerance for HPC 127/ 129

Checkpointing

Exascale

- Toward Exascale Resilience, Cappello F. et al., IJHPCA 23, 4 (2009)
- The International Exascale Software Roadmap, Dongarra, J., Beckman, P. et al., IJHPCA 25, 1 (2011)

ABFT Algorithm-based fault tolerance applied to high performance computing, Bosilca G. et al., JPDC 69, 4 (2009)

Coordinated Checkpointing Distributed snapshots: determining global states of distributed systems, Chandy K.M., Lamport L., ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 3, 1 (1985)

Message Logging A survey of rollback-recovery protocols in message-passing systems, Elnozahy E.N. et al., ACM Comput. Surveys 34, 3 (2002)

Replication Evaluating the viability of process replication reliability for exascale systems, Ferreira K. et al, SC'2011

Models

- Checkpointing strategies for parallel jobs, Bougeret M. et al., SC'2011
- Unified model for assessing checkpointing protocols at extreme-scale, Bosilca G et al., INRIA RR-7950, 2012

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Univ. Tennessee Knoxville

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- Jack Dongarra

Elsewhere

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- Henri Casanova, Univ. Hawai'i
- Saurabh K. Raina, Jaypee IIT, Noida, India

